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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of a bank’s financial crime compliance program, it is increasingly 
common to screen and halt the processing of a payment order for compliance 
investigation where reference is made to a potential, but unconfirmed, target of 
United States economic sanctions.  This essay discusses challenges under Arti-
cle 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code concerning the timing of such an in-
vestigation and the creation of potential liability where a bank wrongly accepts 
by execution a previously halted payment order received from a sender follow-
ing five funds transfer business days after the relevant execution date or pay-
ment date of that order.  In Part II, this paper presents a brief overview of the 
use of funds transfers in the United States and reviews the application of Article 
4A of the Uniform Commercial Code, including rejection, acceptance, cancella-
tion, and amendment of a payment order.  In Part III, the paper overviews Unit-
ed States economic sanctions, the implementation by banks of technology de-
signed to identify and halt the processing of a payment order referencing a 
* Michael Zytnick is a Director at The Bank of New York Mellon specializing in econom-
ic sanctions compliance and a graduate of The George Washington University Law School. Alaina 
Gimbert is Senior Vice President & Associate General Counsel at The Clearing House Payments 
Company, LLC and a graduate of the University of North Carolina School of Law. The views ex-
pressed in this writing are entirely those of the authors and are not associated with any company or 
government authority.
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potential sanctions target, and the timeframe that may be required to investigate 
a halted payment order.  In Part IV, the paper reviews application of Article 
4A’s automatic cancellation and “money back guarantee” provisions where a 
payment order under its purview is wrongly effected and loss allocation be-
tween funds transfer parties for such events.  Part V describes possible contrac-
tual and legislative changes to address the balance of Article 4A’s automatic 
cancellation of an unaccepted payment order after five funds transfer business 
days, sanctions compliance efforts undertaken by banks, and the policy goal of 
completing funds transfers efficiently.
II. UNITED STATES FUNDS TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT AND ARTICLE 4A
In 2019, 286 million transfers, valued at $1,113 trillion, were processed in 
the United States using either the electronic network of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Fedwire® Funds Service, or the funds transfer system of The Clear-
ing House Payments Company, Clearing House Interbank Payments System 
(“CHIPS”).1 Collectively, these two systems represent the major funds transfer 
networks in the United States utilized to make “large-value” and “time-critical” 
transfers.2 These networks are often used to make payments that are part of a 
larger series of payments known as a funds transfer.3 CHIPS, for example, is 
primarily used to clear and settle the U.S. dollar component of an international 
funds transfer.4
It is, in fact, a series of discrete bilateral payment instructions that are gen-
erally formed and required to accomplish any funds transfer.5 For customer 
payments, the first such segment begins between the payment originator and its 
bank, the originating bank, through the issuance of a payment order.6 In some 
cases, the originating bank may be able to send a payment instruction directly to 
the beneficiary’s bank.7 In other cases, the originating bank may need to send 
1. FED. RSRV. BANK SERVS., Fedwire Funds Service - Annual Statistics,
https://www.frbservices.org/resources/financial-services/wires/volume-value-stats/annual-stats.html 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2020); THE CLEARING HOUSE, CHIPS Annual Statistics from 1970 to 2020,
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/new/tch/documents/payment-systems/chips-volume-ytd-
through-june-2020.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). Fedwire is a registered service mark of the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks. CHIPS is a registered service mark of The Clearing House Payments Company, 
LLC. 
2. BANK FOR INT’L. SETTLEMENTS, Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPSS 
Counties, in COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 487 (2012), https://www.bis.org
/cpmi/publ/d105_us.pdf.
3. See ERNEST T. PATRIKIS ET AL., WIRE TRANSFERS: A GUIDE TO U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING FUNDS TRANSFERS 5 (1993). 
4. THE CLEARING HOUSE, CHIPS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL, GOVERNANCE, RISK 
MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATING FRAMEWORK 5 (2020), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media
/new/tch/documents/payment-systems/chips_public_disclosure_june_2020.pdf.
5. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 15. 
6. See id.
7. Id. at 17. 
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its payment instruction to a third bank—an intermediary bank—which can then 
send a payment instruction to a further intermediary bank or the beneficiary 
bank.8 A funds transfer is complete when the beneficiary bank accepts a pay-
ment instruction to pay the beneficiary.9
A. Article 4A Overview
Setting aside rules that may apply to the network or operational platform 
through which a funds transfer is accomplished, the primary law governing the 
use of funds transfers is Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.” 
or “Article 4A”) which has been adopted by all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.10 The provisions of Article 4A have also been broadly incorporated 
into transactions conducted through Fedwire11 and CHIPS.12 Article 4A is the 
culmination of a “careful and delicate balancing” of the competing interests in-
volved in a funds transfer and, thus, it is not appropriate to “resort to principles 
of law or equity” for matters that are directly addressed by the Article.13 How-
ever, for those matters not directly addressed by Article 4A, other doctrines of 
law such as those related to contract, tort, and mistake and restitution may be 
applicable.14 Except as otherwise provided, the requirements of Article 4A may 
be varied by contract.15
A “funds transfer” in Article 4A is defined broadly16 as “the series of trans-
actions, beginning with the originator’s payment order, made for the purpose of 
making payment to the beneficiary of the order.”17 This includes any payment 
order issued by an originator’s bank or an intermediary bank that is intended to 
“carry out” a payment order issued by an originator.18 As provided in Article 
4A, “intermediary bank” includes any bank that receives a payment order that is 
not the originating bank or beneficiary bank.19 If a bank is issuing a funds 
transfer on its own account and not acting for a client, when first issuing pay-
ment, that bank represents both the originator and originating bank under Arti-
8. Id.
9. U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
10. BENJAMIN GEVA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS §1.05 (2019).
11. See 12 C.F.R. § 210.25(b)(1) (2020).
12. See THE CLEARING HOUSE, CHIPS Rules and Administrative Procedures Effective
March 8, 2021, 4 (2020), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/new/tch/documents/payment-
systems/chips_rules_and_administrative_procedures_03-08-2021.pdf.
13. U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
14. Thomas C. Baxter & Raj Bhala, The Interrelationship of Article 4A with Other Law,
BUS. LAW. 1485, 1485 (1990).
15. U.C.C. § 4A-501(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
16. PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 30.
17. U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
18. Id.
19. U.C.C. § 4A-104(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
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cle 4A.20 Even where both the payment originator and payment beneficiary are 
the same person, Article 4A governs the transaction.21 Completion of a funds 
transfer occurs when a payment order is accepted by the beneficiary bank for 
the benefit of the beneficiary (as intended to carry out the originator’s payment 
order).22  Each payment order within a U.C.C. funds transfer falls within the 
ambit of Article 4A.23
A “payment order”24 is an instruction that may be transmitted orally, in
writing, or electronically from a “sender” to a “receiving bank” to pay, or cause 
another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary 
and of which further satisfies three distinct criteria.25 That criteria is as follows: 
(i) the instruction must not apart from the time of payment set any condition of 
payment to the beneficiary; (ii) an account of the sender is debited, or the re-
ceiving bank otherwise receives payment from the sender in reimbursement; 
and (iii) the sender must transmit its instruction directly to the receiving bank 
“or to an agent, funds-transfer system, or communications system for transmit-
tal to the receiving bank.”26  A “bank” for purposes of Article 4A extends to 
“any person in the business of banking”27 and each branch of a bank is viewed 
as a separate bank.28 The payment order may specify a “payment date” upon 
which the amount of the order is payable to the beneficiary;29 it may also speci-
fy an “execution date” upon which the receiving bank may issue a payment or-
der in execution of the order it received.30
Note that a “sender” is any person providing the receiving bank with the in-
struction31 and the “receiving bank” is the bank where that instruction is ad-
dressed.32 A “sender” may be the payment order originator or any later bank 
that issues a payment order to effectuate payment to the beneficiary until the 
beneficiary bank is reached.33 An originating bank that sends a payment order 
to another bank serves as both a “sender” and “receiving bank” under Article 
4A in the effectuation of a funds transfer.34 Similarly, an intermediary bank 
20. U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
21. Id.
22. U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
23. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 30.
24. See id., supra note 3, at 32.
25. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
26. Id.
27. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
28. Id.
29. U.C.C. § 4A-401 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
30. U.C.C. § 4A-301(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
31. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(5) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
32. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
33. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 32.
34. Id.
Spring 2021] Considering Sanctions Compliance 201
will serve as both a sender and receiving bank.  It is the instruction and execu-
tion of payment orders which define the roles of sender and receiving bank.35
B. The Terms that Bind: Rejection, Acceptance, Cancellation, and Amendment 
of a Payment Order
As a threshold matter, there is no duty requiring any receiving bank to agree 
to process forward a payment order that it receives from a sender.36 Funds 
availability, risk, and internal bank policy are just a few of the litany of reasons 
that may underlie the decision by a receiving bank to not accept a payment or-
der.37 When a bank chooses to not accept a payment order, that payment order 
is “rejected” and such action is effective generally when notice is given to the 
sender.38 That notice may be transmitted electronically, in writing, or orally 
and no set prescribed language is mandated by Article 4A for a transmittal to 
constitute rejection.39 Language indicating the receiving bank simply will not 
pay the order is sufficient.40 Where a receiving bank rejects a payment order, 
that payment order may not later be accepted.41
Should a bank choose instead to honor the instruction received, it may “ac-
cept” the payment order.42  The official comments to Article 4A identify that 
“acceptance by the receiving bank of a payment order issued by the sender is 
comparable to acceptance of an offer under the law of contracts.”43 The action 
taken by a bank to manifest payment order acceptance is distinguished by
whether the receiving bank is a bank other than the beneficiary bank, or the 
beneficiary bank.44 In any setting where the receiving bank of the sender’s 
payment order is not the beneficiary bank, acceptance occurs upon execution of 
that order.45 Execution of a payment order, under Article 4A, arises when a 
bank issues its own payment order that carries out a payment order received 
from a sender.46
35. Id.
36. See id. at 53.
37. See id. at 66.
38. U.C.C. § 4A-210(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. U.C.C. § 4A-210(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
42. U.C.C. § 4A-209; see also PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 66.
43. U.C.C. § 4A-211 cmt. 6 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018.
44. U.C.C. § 4A-209 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
45. U.C.C. § 4A-209(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018); but see U.C.C. § 4A-
209(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018) (“A payment order issued to the originator’s bank 
cannot be accepted until the payment date if the bank is the beneficiary’s bank, or the execution date 
if the bank is not the beneficiary’s bank.”).
46. U.C.C. § 4A-301(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
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A beneficiary bank receiving a payment order, however, accepts that order 
upon the earliest of four separate events.47 In the first, acceptance occurs by the 
beneficiary bank making payment in accordance with the payment order to the 
beneficiary.48 In the second, acceptance occurs by the beneficiary bank notify-
ing the beneficiary that its account has been credited or that the payment order 
has been received, provided that notice does not condition withdrawal on re-
ceipt of actual payment from the sender.49 In the third, the beneficiary bank re-
ceives the entire amount of funds associated with a payment order to the benefi-
ciary from the sending bank.50 The fourth and final event occurs at the opening 
of the next funds transfer business day for the beneficiary bank after the pay-
ment date of an order received where there is a withdrawable credit balance in 
an authorized account of the sender that fully covers the payment order or the 
beneficiary bank has otherwise been paid in full by the sender— unless the 
payment order is rejected in accordance within parameters of Article 4A.51 In 
both the third and fourth situations described above, acceptance may not occur 
before the payment order itself is received by the beneficiary bank.52 Addition-
ally, acceptance does not occur under the second and third situation if the bene-
ficiary does not have an account with the beneficiary bank, the account has been 
closed, or the beneficiary bank is not permitted by law to receive credits for the 
beneficiary’s account.53
By operation of law, any unaccepted payment order is cancelled following 
the close of the fifth funds transfer business day of the receiving bank after the, 
as appropriate, execution date or payment date of that order.54 Yet, within this 
five-day period, where a payment order is awaiting the receiving bank’s deci-
sion as to acceptance, the sender may communicate notice that it seeks to cancel 
or amend the payment order.55 A sender may also request cancellation or 
amendment of a payment order after its acceptance by the receiving bank.56
Where this communication is received and permits the receiving bank to 
reasonably act on the instruction to cancel or amend a payment order prior to its 
acceptance, the instruction is effective.57 Where a sender communicates the 
cancellation or amendment of its payment order after acceptance by the receiv-
ing bank, the instruction is not effective unless either a funds transfer system 
47. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
48. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
49. Id.; see also PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 18–20, 62 (suggesting that in certain cir-
cumstances a payment order may be received by a beneficiary bank before the payment itself).
50. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
51. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
52. U.C.C. § 4A-209(c) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
53. Id.
54. U.C.C. § 4A-211(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
55. U.C.C. § 4A-211 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
56. Id.
57. U.C.C. § 4A-211(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
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rule permits cancellation without the agreement of the receiving bank or the re-
ceiving bank agrees to honor the communication in accordance with Article 4A 
provisions.58 Once cancelled, by operation of law or otherwise, a payment or-
der cannot be later accepted.59
Under the U.C.C., even where the receiving bank seeks to honor the send-
er’s cancellation or amendment request, to be effective, if the receiving bank is 
a bank other than the beneficiary bank and has issued a payment order to anoth-
er bank, it must itself issue a conforming cancellation or amendment of the 
payment order.60 A beneficiary bank, on the other hand, is further limited under 
Article 4A to action the cancellation or amendment of an accepted payment or-
der.61 The U.C.C. provides that a beneficiary bank may only amend or cancel 
an accepted payment order where related to an unauthorized order or where a 
mistake of a sender in the funds transfer resulted in a payment order that: (i) is a 
duplicate; (ii) instructs payment to a beneficiary not entitled to payment from 
the originator; or (iii) instructs a payment amount greater than that ordered by 
the originator.62
C. The Nonnegotiable Money Back Guarantee
The sender of a payment order under Article 4A is excused from payment 
and entitled to a refund—if payment in satisfaction of that order has already 
been made—in cases where a funds transfer is not completed by a beneficiary 
bank’s acceptance of a payment order instructing payment to the beneficiary in 
accordance with that sender’s payment order.63 Moreover, in any case, where 
the sender of a payment order makes payment for the order but was not obliged 
under Article 4A to make the payment, the sender is entitled to a refund from 
the receiving bank.64 These U.C.C. requirements have come to be known as the 
“money back guarantee.”65 Notably, these provisions are not limited to the 
originator of the payment order, but any sender, including an intermediary 
bank.66 No agreement may alter rights under the U.C.C. of the sender to be ex-
cused from payment or receive a refund in these circumstances.67 In addition to 
58. U.C.C. § 4A-211(c) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
59. U.C.C. § 4A-211(e) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
60. U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
61. U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
62. Id., but see U.C.C. § 4A-209(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2018) (explaining 
that the acceptance of a payment order by the originator’s bank prior to the payment date, if the 
beneficiary’s bank, or the execution date, if not the beneficiary’s bank, is not effective and the pay-
ment order may subsequently be cancelled).  
63. U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)–(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
64. U.C.C. § 4A-402(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
65. PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.
66. U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)–(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018); see also PATRIKIS ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 60.
67. U.C.C. § 4A-402(f) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
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the return of principal, the sender may also be due interest on the refundable 
amount from the date of payment,68 expenses in the funds transfer, incidental 
expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees.69 Furthermore, if provided expressly 
by contract of the receiving bank, consequential damages may also be recovera-
ble.70
As a technical point and in a somewhat more infrequent case, if an interme-
diary bank is mandated by the money back guarantee to refund payment associ-
ated with a payment order due to payment incompletion, but is unable to do so 
because of applicable law or other reasons specified by Article 4A, such as clo-
sure of the bank— a sender who executed a payment order in compliance with 
an instruction to route the order through that intermediary bank is permitted to 
receive or withhold payment from the party that issued the routing instruction.71
The first sender who issued the routing instruction through the intermediary 
bank for the funds transfer is subrogated with respect to refund under the money 
back guarantee to the right of the bank that paid the intermediary bank.72
III. SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury administers various economic sanctions programs of the United 
States.73 The successor of the Office of Foreign Funds Control, following the 
entry of China into the Korean War, OFAC was first established in December 
1950.74 Requirements under U.S. economic sanctions generally include the 
freezing of assets (i.e. “blocking”) or other commercial restrictions, such as 
those involving trade.75 The individual sanctions regimes administered by 
OFAC are commonly “country-based,” including those targeting Cuba, Iran, 
North Korea, and Syria, or “list-based,” such as those targeting persons in-
volved in acts of terrorism or narcotics trafficking.76 Economic sanctions may 
be employed in concert with other related authorities, such as anti-money laun-
dering measures, and are typically focused on those actions expected to gener-
68. U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)–(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
69. U.C.C. § 4A-305(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
70. U.C.C. § 4A-305(c) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
71. See U.C.C. § 4A-402(e) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
72. Id.
73. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-sanctions-programs-and-
information (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
74. Press Release, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/tfi_factsheet.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2021).
75. How OFAC Officers Pursue the OFAC Mission: Hearings on the Financing of Terror-
ism Before the S. Comm. on Housing Banking & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (Statement of 
R. Richard Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control).
76. Id.
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ate the greatest impact in addressing events giving rise to the introduction of 
sanctions.77 From January 2017 to March 2019 alone, OFAC issued in excess 
of 150 sanctions actions extending to over 2,000 targets.78
The jurisdictional reach of OFAC customarily extends to “U.S. persons,” as 
defined to include United States citizens and permanent resident aliens wherev-
er located, entities organized under the laws of the United States (including for-
eign branches), and persons within the United States.79 Jurisdiction may also 
extend to non-U.S. subsidiaries of United States persons,80 activity conducted 
within the United States,81 that involving U.S. origin goods,82 and any person 
causing a United States person to violate sanctions.83 Even when OFAC may 
not exercise jurisdiction, non-U.S. persons may nevertheless choose to comply 
with U.S. sanctions because of the risk introduced by so-called “secondary 
sanctions” that can result in the imposition of blocking or other restrictions 
against a person for conducting or facilitating certain, generally significant, ac-
tivity involving a target of OFAC sanctions—including where there exists no 
nexus to the United States.84
Enforcement actions associated with a violation of OFAC sanctions can be 
significant.85 The enforcement actions may also be introduced based upon a 
theory of strict liability.86 In 2019 alone, OFAC’s enforcement actions exceed-
77. See Evaluating the Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions Programs: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. Monetary Policy & Trade of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. (2017) (Statement of 
John E. Smith, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control).
78. Treasury’s Role in Fighting Financial Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Fin. 
Servs. and Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. (2019) (Statement of Sigal 
Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence).
79. Thomas V. McVey, U.S. Sanctions Laws: Dangers Ahead For Foreign Companies (Part 
I), WILLIAMS MULLEN (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.williamsmullen.com/news/us-sanctions-laws-
dangers-ahead-foreign-companies; see also 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.314, 570.313, 582.313, 589.312, 
591.312 (2020). 
80. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 510.214, 560.215 (2020). 
81. See Exec. Order No. 13,808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,155 (Aug. 29, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13,827, 83 Fed Reg. 12,469 (Mar. 21, 2018).
82. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.205 (2020).
83. See 50 U.S.C § 1705 (2018).
84. See Thomas V. McVey, U.S. Sanctions Laws: Dangers Ahead For Foreign Companies
(Part II), WILLIAMS MULLEN (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.williamsmullen.com/news/us-sanctions-
laws-dangers-ahead-foreign-companies-part-ii-0; see also, e.g., Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-272, 128 Stat. 2952; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-102, 129 Stat. 2205; Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886. 
85. Patterns of Abuse: Assessing Bank Secrecy Act Compliance and Enforcement Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 32–33 (2013) (statement of David S. 
Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence) (describing significant financial 
penalties for violating OFAC regulations).
86. OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, OPENING SECURITIES AND FUTURES ACCOUNTS 
FROM AN OFAC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international
/standards-codes/Documents/securities_future_accounts_11052008.pdf.
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ed $1.2 billion in value.87 Under the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act, the underlying statutory authority upon which most U.S. sanctions re-
gimes existing today find their legal foundation,88 each individual violation may 
give rise to a potential civil monetary penalty of $307,922 or twice the value of 
the transaction, whichever is larger.89 The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designa-
tion Act, a separate statute under which certain other OFAC sanctions have 
been introduced, provides for a maximum civil monetary assessment of 
$1,529,991 for each violation.90
As part of its administration of economic sanctions, OFAC publishes the 
List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) that 
identifies various sanctions targets whose property and interests in property are 
blocked.91 At any point in time, thousands of U.S. sanctions targets may appear 
on the SDN List.92 OFAC further publishes a “Consolidated Sanctions List” of 
targets subject to various other sanctions.93 As the name implies, the Consoli-
dated Sanctions List aggregates various other U.S. sanctions lists, which are 
published by OFAC into a single resource.94
It is important to recognize that collectively, these publicly available lists 
published by OFAC are not representative of the totality of U.S. sanctions tar-
gets.95  For example, an entity that is owned fifty percent or more by one or 
more OFAC blocking targets is itself to be treated as subject to blocking sanc-
tions notwithstanding whether that entity appears on the SDN List.96 Addition-
ally, various governments and government actors have been targeted under U.S. 
87. GIBSON DUNN, 2019 YEAR-END SANCTIONS UPDATE 1 (2020).
88. Brian O’Toole & Samantha Sultoon, Sanctions Explained: How a Foreign Policy Prob-
lem Becomes a Sanctions Program, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 22, 2019), 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/feature/sanctions-explained-how-a-foreign-policy-
problem-becomes-a-sanctions-program/.
89. 31 C.F.R. § 501 app. A (2020). In March 2021, the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
adjusted for inflation the maximum amount of the civil monetary penalties that may be assessed 
under relevant regulations. 31 C.F.R. § 501 (2020). This Comment uses the penalty amounts estab-
lished in 2020. 
90. Id.
91. Smith, supra note 77, at 8 (statement of John E. Smith, Director, Office of Foreign As-
sets Control).
92. See id.
93. See Consolidated Sanctions List Data Files, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/consolidated-sanctions-list-data-files 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2021).
94. See id.
95. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, REVISED GUIDANCE ON ENTITIES OWNED BY 
PERSONS WHOSE PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY ARE BLOCKED (2014); see also Exec. 
Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6,659 (Feb. 8, 2012) (among other things, blocking the property and 
interests in property of Iranian financial institutions).
96. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 95.
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sanctions, yet the names of these targets may not appear on sanctions-related 
lists published by OFAC.97
To address potential economic sanctions risk, OFAC strongly encourages 
the development of a risk-focused sanctions compliance program.98 That pro-
gram should incorporate five identified “essential components” of compliance: 
management commitment; risk assessment; internal controls; independent pro-
gram testing; and training.99 These components serve as a minimum baseline 
standard for an OFAC compliance program and organizations frequently will 
augment their sanctions compliance program to include additional elements.100
Commonly the deployment and use of specialized electronic tools contain-
ing the SDN List and other OFAC lists to screen customers, counterparties, and 
financial transactions will form part of a company’s sanctions compliance pro-
gram controls.101 This specialized screening control is generally expected to 
flag names even when they are not an exact match to listed individuals and enti-
ties.102 List enhancements, including alternative spellings of published sanc-
tioned parties or industry-specific identifiers, for instance, those identifying 
large corporates and banks published by the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”), may further be incorporated into an 
OFAC screening application.103
On a global basis, banks regularly screen for sanctions risk transactions (in-
cluding funds transfers), prior to completion.  This form of sanctions screening 
is known as that conducted on a “real-time” basis and is most prevalent for ac-
tivities international in nature.104 This is not to say that real-time screening oc-
curs entirely with respect to cross-border financial activities, as that which is 
purely domestic may also be screened to the same standard (i.e., screening upon 
receipt of a payment order and prior to execution of payment).105 Furthermore, 
for wire payments, there is no flag or other indicator that readily identifies 
whether the payment is international or domestic.106 Hence, even if banks 
97. See Exec. Order No. 13,884, 84 Fed. Reg. 38,843 (Aug. 7, 2019) (blocking property of 
the Government of Venezuela, including its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities); 
Exec. Order No. 13,722, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,941 (Mar. 8, 2016) (blocking property of the Government 
of North Korea, including its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities); Exec. Order No. 
13,582, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209 (Aug. 22, 2011) (blocking property of the Government of Syria, in-
cluding its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities).




101. See id. at 11.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. WOLFSBURG GRP., WOLFSBURG GUIDANCE ON SANCTIONS SCREENING 1-2, 8 (2019).
105. See id.
106. In contrast, ACH payments have a specific message type, the IAT (developed with the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control), that is used to distinguish payments that are international from 
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wanted to apply different levels of screening to domestic wires and international 
wires, there would be limited practical means to distinguish the wires in their 
payment processing systems.
The return of a potential alert from the use of a specialized screening appli-
cation is not itself determinative of sanctions risk.107 An additional manual re-
view is frequently required to make an initial determination as to whether the 
alert generated may be discounted as a clear false positive or is one requiring 
additional investigation.108 The percentage of financial transactions halted in 
real-time for manual review may differ greatly between institutions based upon 
factors including screening settings and list enhancements.109
The exact percentage of payment orders being halted due to a potential 
sanctions-related alert can vary between a range as expansive as approximately 
one percent110 and thirty-three percent of all transactions submitted for pro-
cessing at a major U.S. bank.111 Applying these percentages across the Fedwire 
and CHIPS payments landscape in 2019, this range would represent the pausing 
of approximately 2.9 million to 94 million payment orders across a twelve-
month period conducted through the major U.S. funds transfer systems before 
execution for economic sanctions compliance review.112 In fact, the number of 
payment orders paused is presumably somewhat higher, since some payment 
orders that are paused are determined to be prohibited and, thus, are never exe-
cuted through Fedwire or CHIPS.113 The vast majority of all transactions ini-
tially halted in real-time because of a sanctions-related alert are cleared for fur-
ther processing within a matter of minutes.114 However, a small percentage of 
transactions will require heightened investigation and cannot be actioned imme-
diately.115  In certain cases, these transactions requiring heightened investiga-
tion may even be escalated to OFAC for further review and consultation.116
To place sanctions screening statistics into further perspective, one major 
U.S. bank reported in 2015 that of 1.1 million financial transactions received 
those that are purely domestic. See International ACH Transactions (IATs), NACHA (Apr. 23, 
2019), https://www.nacha.org/content/international-ach-transactions-iats.
107. See WOLFSBURG GRP., supra note 104 at 2.
108. Angel Swift & Daniela Dekhtyar-McCarthy, Challenging the Status Quo: Sanctions 
Screening, ACAMS TODAY (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.acamstoday.org/challenging-the-status-
quo-sanctions-screening/.
109. See WOLFSBURG GRP., supra note 104 at 2.
110. David Cortright et al., Targeted Financial Sanctions: Smart Sanctions That Do Work, in 
SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 23, 34 (David Cortright & George A. 
Lopez eds., 2002). 
111. Swift & Dekhtyar-McCarthy, supra note 108.
112. See FED. RSRV. BANK SERVS., supra note 1; THE CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 1.
113. See generally Newcomb, supra note 75 (describing the interdiction of prohibited transac-
tions involving U.S. sanctions targets). 
114. Swift & Dekhtyar-McCarthy, supra note 108.
115. Cortright et al., supra note 110, at 34.
116. Id.
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daily, 35,000, or three percent, alerted due to a potential match in its sanctions 
screening tool.117 Of this amount, 3,550 or ten percent of that alerting on a dai-
ly basis, required further investigation and could not be resolved the same 
day.118 Utilizing various methods, but with “minimum investigation,” 3,470 of 
those payments were later released for further processing, while the remaining 
80 transactions were escalated to a central compliance function for appropriate 
action.119
Over a 30 business day period, these figures suggest that for one major U.S. 
bank, 106,500 financial transactions required at least what is described as “min-
imum investigation” to resolve the sanctions alert and may have been unable to 
process the same day—while 2,400 transactions required disposition by a cen-
tral compliance function and something other than minimum investigation.120
At an industry level, a research survey published by an organization active in 
addressing financial crime compliance requirements identified at a regional lev-
el that approximately five percent of all funds transfer sanctions alerts required 
in excess of six days to resolve, while an additional eleven percent of alerts re-
quired between three and five days for resolution.121
It is also notable that in more recent years, certain U.S. sanctions have im-
posed increasingly surgical restrictions on specific types of transactions (such as 
those related to new equity issuances or new debt of a sanctions target) with the 
aim of achieving specific policy goals while minimizing “disruptions to the 
‘plumbing’ of the international financial system.”122 However, such restrictions 
can introduce more nuanced and complex reviews by banks into the purpose or 
commercial terms underlying a halted transfer of funds to determine permissi-
bility of payment.123 Such a review into the purpose or commercial terms un-
derlying a halted transfer of funds may ordinarily be triggered only after it is 
first determined a payment order in fact involves a sanctions target which is the 
subject of a restriction focused on more narrow classes of transaction types.124
117. Aengus O’ Connor, Enhancing the Client Experience New Client Operations Models,





121. LEXISNEXIS, UNCOVER THE TRUE COST OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING & KYC
COMPLIANCE 12 (2017).
122. David S. Cohen, The Evolution of U.S. Financial Power, in U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY PRESS CTR. (2014).
123. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Enforcement Information for Apr. 25, 2019 (de-
scribing the rejection by financial institutions of certain funds transfers following a determination 
those transactions represented prohibited debt of greater than a specified maturity in accordance 
with Directive 2 under Exec. Order No. 13,662).
124. See O’ Connor, supra note 117, at 6.
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IV. EXTENDED COMPLIANCE REVIEWS OF PAYMENT ORDERS, AUTOMATIC FIVE-
DAY CANCELLATION, AND THE ARTICLE 4A MONEY BACK GUARANTEE
Article 4A is intended to be the exclusive means of determining rights, du-
ties, and liabilities of the subject matter covered under its scope.125 Claims un-
der the common law that would impose liability inconsistent with Article 4A 
are generally precluded.126 This is not to say that Article 4A is a “hermetic le-
gal seal over funds transfers,” as it is intended to “synergize” with other legal 
doctrines and resorting to principles of law and equity that are consistent with 
its provisions is acceptable.127
With technical precision, Article 4A provides that any payment order that is 
not accepted is cancelled by operation of law at the close of the fifth funds 
transfer business day following the, as appropriate, execution date or payment 
date of that order.128 Once cancelled, a payment order cannot later be accepted 
by the bank receiving that order.129 Cancellation of a payment order means that 
the funds transfer has not been completed.130 In cases where the sender already 
paid for a payment order and was not obliged to pay because of non-acceptance 
of that order by the receiving bank or because the funds transfer was not com-
pleted, it is due a refund from the bank receiving payment.131 This right to re-
fund applies to each previous payment order in the funds transfer for which the 
sender paid the receiving bank.132 Hence, to the extent that the originator paid 
the originating bank for its payment order, the originator has a right to be repaid 
when a funds transfer is not completed because one of the payment orders with-
in the funds transfer is cancelled.133 It would appear to follow by extension that 
this would include circumstances where a receiving bank takes more than five 
funds transfer business days to determine that a payment order does not violate 
125. U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
126. Grain Traders, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 160 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1998); Receivers of Sa-
bena SA v. Deutsche Bank A.G., 142 A.D.3d 242, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
127. See Sheerbonnet, Ltd. v. American Exp. Bank, Ltd., 951 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995).
128. U.C.C. § 4A-211(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
129. U.C.C. § 4A-211(e) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
130. This is so because a funds transfer is comprised of a series of payment orders that carry 
out the originator’s instruction to pay the beneficiary and is not complete until the beneficiary’s
bank accepts a payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary. See U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (AM. L.
INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).  Given that under U.C.C. § 4A-211(e) a payment order cannot be 
accepted after it is cancelled, a cancellation of any payment order within the series of payment or-
ders between the originator and the beneficiary’s bank means that the funds transfer has stopped 
before the beneficiary bank has accepted a payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary.  See
U.C.C. § 4A-211(e) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).  Hence, under Article 4A’s frame-
work, a cancelled payment order results in an incomplete funds transfer.
131. U.C.C. § 4A-402(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
132. PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 60.
133. Id.
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U.S. sanctions laws and erroneously purports to “accept” the already cancelled 
payment order through issuance of its own payment order.134
Acceptance, again, for a bank other than the beneficiary bank generally oc-
curs upon its own execution of the payment order received.135  A beneficiary 
bank on the other hand accepts a payment order at the earliest of certain condi-
tions (discussed supra) identified in Article 4A.136 But a bank may not accept a 
cancelled payment order,137 and the risk of automatic cancellation awaits where 
a payment is not properly accepted within five funds transfer business days.138
Particularly where a payment order is selected for extended investigation by the 
originating bank or an intermediary bank due to a real-time sanctions screening 
alert, a determination subsequent to order cancellation by operation of law that 
the funds transfer did not implicate activity prohibited under U.S. sanctions re-
quires that any funds received as payment for that order be returned to the send-
er.139
Improper execution following a sanctions compliance review by the receiv-
ing bank of a payment order cancelled by operation of law will introduce poten-
tial liability under the Article 4A money back guarantee provisions.140 Where a 
situation is covered by Article 4A, its exclusive province endures.141
There is little debate that actions appropriate and necessary to comply with 
the extensive framework of federal laws and regulations governing U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions are expected of persons subject to OFAC jurisdiction.142 Nota-
bly, in connection with the administration of these programs, certain U.S. sanc-
tions regimes preclude the holding of a person liable for actions or omissions in 
good faith in compliance with the requirements.143  Notwithstanding a bank’s 
actions to halt a payment order due to a real-time sanctions alert or succeeding 
decision to conduct an appropriate investigation to determine whether that 
transaction is in conformance with OFAC requirements— the shield of such a 
liability limitation very well may not extend beyond a finding that activity the 
subject of an inquiry is not implicated by U.S. sanctions.144 At such time, the 
requirements of Article 4A, including the provision cancelling an unaccepted 
payment order by operation of law after five funds transfer business days would 
134. See U.C.C. § 4A-402(d)–(e) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018). See generally 
U.C.C. § 4A-205 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018) (identifying payment obligations for 
certain properly accepted payment orders that are erroneously instructed or transmitted).
135. U.C.C. § 4A-209(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2018).
136. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).  
137. U.C.C. § 4A-211(e) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).  
138. See U.C.C. § 4A-211(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
139. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-211(d)–(e), 4A-402(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).  
140. See U.C.C. § 4A-402(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).  
141. Sheerbonnet, 951 F. Supp. at 408 (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. 4A–102 official cmt.).
142. OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 98, at 1.
143. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3).
144. See id. 
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appear to be restored.145 Hence, as a practical matter, there is a need for banks 
to keep track of the five funds transfer day period in their sanctions reviews in 
order to mitigate the risk that they might improperly execute a payment order 
that has been automatically cancelled under Article 4A.146
Another practical point to consider is that historically the sender of a pay-
ment order did not have visibility into how long it takes for the receiving bank 
to execute a payment order, and, thus, would not have necessarily known that a 
payment order was delayed more than five funds transfer days.147 This is 
changing as payment systems, including wires, become more transparent be-
tween banks and even to originators and beneficiaries.148 In addition, as legacy 
funds transfer systems consider 24x7 operating models and as certain low-value 
funds transfers can now be conducted over the RTP149 System, which operates 
24x7, weekends and holidays can be funds transfer days.150  Hence, now is a 
good time for banks to consider the implications of extended sanctions reviews 
and Article 4A’s automatic cancellation provision.
Litigation that has centered on Article 4A’s automatic cancellation provi-
sion has arisen from competing claims to blocked funds, i.e., funds transfers in 
which the beneficiary never received payment.151 For situations in which a re-
ceiving bank improperly executes a cancelled payment order following a sanc-
145. See Receivers of Sabena SA v. Deutsche Bank A.G., 142 A.D.3d 242, 260 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2016) (holding that upon the lifting of a federal block, an interrupted funds transfer cancelled 
by operation of law by Article 4A is to be refunded to the sender); but see Bank of New York v. 
Nickel, 14 A.D.3d 140, 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that OFAC requirements do not 
preempt Article 4A requirements not in conflict upon the lifting of a federal block, but finding that 
in an interpleader action where U.C.C. provisions cancelling a payment order by operation of law 
had not been raised, in a contest between a payment beneficiary and creditor of the originator, funds 
should be transferred to the beneficiary); see also European American Bank v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 
12 A.D.3d 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (upholding that an interrupted funds transfer following the 
vacating of a marshal’s levy should be released to the beneficiary bank in a case that did not raise 
U.C.C. provisions cancelling a payment order by operation of law).  
146. U.C.C. § 4A-211(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
147. Furthermore, if a sender inquired with a receiving bank about the status of a payment 
order and was told that the order was under regulatory or compliance review, the sender likely 
would assume that the receiving bank would be “immune” from any claims related to the delay.  
This is not an unreasonable assumption given that other laws do accommodate the time needed for 
sanctions reviews.  For example, delays related to sanctions reviews are excused from certain con-
sumer error claims under Regulation E’s “remittance transfer rule”. See 12 C.F.R. § 
1005.33(a)(iv)(B) (2020).
148. For example, SWIFT has an initiative to make international wire payments that are con-
ducted through correspondent banking faster and more transparent. See generally The Digital Trans-
formation of Cross-border Payments, SWIFT (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.swift.com/our-solutions
/swift-gpi/about-swift-gpi.
149. RTP, Registration No. 5287247.
150. See Carl Slabicki, Real-Time Payments Now a Reality, THE CLEARING HOUSE, (2018), 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2018/2018-q2-banking-perspectives/articles
/real-time-payments-now-a-reality.
151. See Receivers of Sabena SA v. Deutsche Bank A.G., 142 A.D.3d 242, 244 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2016); Bank of New York v. Nickel, 14 A.D.3d 140, 142-45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
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tions review that extends beyond five funds transfer business days and the bene-
ficiary is ultimately paid, litigation seems unlikely since the fundamental pur-
pose of the funds transfer—payment from the originator to the beneficiary—
has been fulfilled.152  Hence, only in cases in which an originator later deter-
mines that it did not intend to pay the beneficiary—such as when the origina-
tor’s payment order was unauthorized or the originator was fraudulently in-
duced to send a payment order to an unintended beneficiary—is it foreseeable 
that an originator might seek a refund for a cancelled payment order.153 How-
ever, because the right to refund is prefaced on the assumption that a cancelled 
payment order results in a failure to pay the beneficiary (i.e., the funds transfer 
is incomplete), then the fact that the beneficiary was in fact paid should mean in 
the ordinary course that refund is not appropriate even though there was a tech-
nical cancellation of the payment order.154
To the extent a court found an originating bank must refund the amount of a 
payment order to the originator because the funds transfer was deemed incom-
plete due to an improper acceptance of a payment order even though the benefi-
ciary was in fact paid, the bank that ultimately sits with the loss155 would pre-
sumably be able to pursue a common law claim against the beneficiary since 
Article 4A does not directly address such a circumstance.156 Recovery from a 
party not entitled to retain funds under the governing law of mistake and restitu-
tion or other applicable law is not precluded by Article 4A.157 The only re-
straint is that the principles of law and equity ought not be inconsistent with 
U.C.C. provisions.158
Article 4A also applies special rules concerning loss allocation related to 
three forms of “erroneous” payment orders and prescribes with detail appropri-
ate remedies in such cases.159 These cases involve funds transfers erroneously: 
(1) directed to a beneficiary not intended by the sender; (2) sent in an amount 
152. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 51 (discussing the common sense “no harm, no 
foul” principle in the context of mistaken payments and unauthorized transfers where a satisfactory 
result is obtained).
153. While Article 4A has provisions that directly addresses liability for unauthorized and 
fraudulently induced payment orders, an originator who is unsuccessful in shifting liability to the 
originating bank under these provisions might assert a claim for refund of its payment order if it 
appears that any payment order in the funds transfer chain was delayed beyond five funds transfer 
days. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-305(b), 4A-402(c)–(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2018).
154. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018) (describing that every con-
tract or duty under the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in both its 
performance and enforcement). 
155. Since the money back guarantee provision would be available to each bank (originating 
and intermediary) that properly accepted and paid for its payment order, under Article 4A the bank 
that improperly accepted a payment order would likely sit with the loss. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra
note 3, at 71–72 (describing that any sender is entitled to the money-back guarantee).
156. See U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 3 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
157. See id.
158. Sheerbonnet, 951 F. Supp. at 408 (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. 4A–102 cmt.).
159. See U.C.C. § 4A-205(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 1989).
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greater than that intended by the sender; or (3) transmitted as a duplicate of a
prior payment order sent by a sender.160 If a sender is excused from payment of 
the entire funds transfer amount or a portion of the funds transfer amount under 
this provision of the U.C.C., the receiving bank is entitled to recover the errone-
ous amount transferred from the beneficiary “to the extent allowed by” the law 
governing mistake and restitution.161 Importantly, a sender may lose its excusal 
from paying all or part of the payment under these specific provisions if it re-
ceived notice that its order was accepted or its account was debited and ordinary 
care had not been taken to discover the error within ninety days of the notice 
received.162  At a more general level, placing aside the special loss allocation 
rules in relation to particular types of erroneous payments, where a sender that 
is the customer of a receiving bank has paid for a payment order accepted by its 
bank (and received reasonable notice of that order), an assertion that the bank is 
not entitled to retain payment must be made within one year of the notification 
received.163
V. A PATH FORWARD
As noted above, given the important ongoing requirements of U.S. sanc-
tions laws as well as the increasing speed, transparency, and 24x7 operations of 
payment systems it is an opportune time to consider implications of Article 
4A’s automatic cancellation provision.  While the provision was intended to 
prevent unexpected acceptance of “stale” payment orders, in the context of 
sanctions reviews, is automatic cancellation the right policy outcome?
To mitigate potential liability for improper acceptance of a cancelled pay-
ment order, a bank subjecting a payment order to a real-time sanctions compli-
ance review could steadfastly follow U.C.C. requirements upon a determination 
that U.S. sanctions do not implicate or otherwise require action to be taken un-
der federal law.164 That is, where a payment order is held for a period exceed-
ing five funds transfer days because of a sanctions real-time compliance review 
and upon a finding that the transaction does not implicate activity prohibited by 
federal law, the bank could recognize the cancellation of the payment order and 
refund any funds received from the sender in satisfaction of that order.165 Yet 
returning a significant volume of funds associated with payment orders can-
celled by operation of law due to extended sanctions investigations may never-
theless run counter to the Article 4A policy goal of efficiency, including that of 
low cost where subsequent payment order resubmission occurs.166
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. U.C.C. § 4A-205(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
163. U.C.C. § 4A-505 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
164. See Receivers of Sabena SA, 142 A.D.3d at 106.
165. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-211(d), 4A-402(c)–(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
166. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 23.
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Article 4A in prescribing detailed and precise rules governing funds trans-
fers leaves the door open for parties to vary by agreement its terms unless oth-
erwise proscribed.167 While the requirements related to the U.C.C. money back 
guarantee may not be varied by agreement,168 notably, no similar restriction ap-
plies to the Article 4A provision cancelling an unaccepted payment order by 
operation of law after five funds transfer business days.169 In this regard, a bank 
ostensibly by agreement could vary the terms of Article 4A such that an unac-
cepted payment order is only automatically cancelled after a period of time ex-
ceeding five funds transfer business days.170 This approach may further the pol-
icy goal of “efficiency” in electronic funds transfers by recognizing that but for 
a review to verify compliance with U.S. sanctions law, the originator of a pay-
ment order would prefer to have the funds transfer completed rather than have 
funds returned and instruct a second payment order to the intended benefi-
ciary.171 However, the originator might rather that no change to Article 4A 
provisions occur in preventing an “unexpected delayed acceptance.”172
Even if a sender and receiving bank agreed to vary the automatic cancella-
tion provision of Article 4A, a funds transfer involves a series of separate pay-
ment orders between each pair of senders and receiving banks.173 Hence, a con-
tractual provision would need to be in place between each pair to ensure that no 
matter which payment order or orders were delayed beyond five funds transfer 
days due to sanctions review, none would be deemed cancelled.174 While funds 
transfer system rules could potentially be revised to permit for longer sanctions 
reviews, such rules would only be effective between the banks participating in 
the systems and not to other parties to the funds transfer.175
There may exist a case for broader advocacy to amend the provision of Ar-
ticle 4A cancelling an unaccepted payment order following five funds transfer 
business days to better address the unique timing challenges introduced for 
funds transfers determined to require heightened review for sanctions compli-
ance.176 Here, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial 
Code (a joint committee of the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law 
Commission)177 could recommend an amendment to §4A-211 for the Uniform 
167. See U.C.C. § 4A-501 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
168. U.C.C. § 4A-402(f) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
169. U.C.C. § 4A-211(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018); see also id. § 4A-402(f).
170. See id.
171. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 23.
172. See U.C.C. § 4A-211 cmt. 7 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
173. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 30.
174. See id. at 128–29.
175. U.C.C. § 4A-501(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2018).
176. See generally PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 9 (describing that the drafting committee 
of Article 4A wanted wire transfers to be “fast, secure, and cheap” and that the rules introduced 
should foster these objectives).
177. AM. LAW. INST., Uniform Commercial Code, https://www.ali.org/publications/show
/uniform-commercial-code/ (last visited June 2, 2020).
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Law Commission’s approval that would more consistently permit increased tim-
ing for banks to accept a payment order halted in real-time for a sanctions com-
pliance review.178 A change to the model Article 4A rules addressing the 
unique timing elements of OFAC compliance practices may help to further the 
wider policy objectives of funds transfer efficiency.179
There may also exist a case for considering the sanctions compliance side of 
the equation.  Hence, it may also be appropriate for banks and policymakers to 
consider how the goals of U.S. sanctions laws can be more effectively ad-
dressed in a time when payments are becoming faster to meet the needs of U.S. 
consumers and businesses.
178. See U.C.C. § 4A-211(d) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2018). 
179. See PATRIKIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 9.
